

FM 30-5

WAR DEPARTMENT FIELD MANUAL

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

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RESTRICTED. DISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED MATTER.
No person is entitled solely by virtue of his grade or position to knowledge or possession of classified matter. Such matter is entrusted only to those individuals whose official duties require such knowledge or possession. (See also paragraph 23b, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.)

WAR DEPARTMENT

FEBRUARY 1946

This manual supersedes FM 30-5, 17 April 1940, including C 1, 2 January 1941; C 2, 27 July 1942; C 3, 12 January 1943; and C 4, 21 January 1943.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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FOREWORD

A general must be governed by his intelligence, and must regulate his measures by his information. It is his duty to obtain correct information; and among the most valuable traits of a military character is the skill to select those means which will obtain it. Yet the best selected means are not always successful; and, in a new army where military talent has not been well tried by the standard of experience, the general is peculiarly exposed to the chance of employing not the best instruments.

From John Marshall's *Life of George Washington*.

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SECTION I

GENERAL

1. SCOPE. a. General. This manual sets forth the fundamental considerations relative to military intelligence in the theater of operations, and is prescribed as a guide in the organization, training and employment of intelligence personnel of all combat units. It is also prescribed as a guide for pertinent activities of the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department.

b. Scope. This manual is based on fundamental doctrines contained in FM 100-5. For the sake of brevity and uniformity the terminology, basic situations and explanations herein presented relate almost exclusively to Ground Forces whereas special terminology and detailed situations peculiar to the Air Forces and various other arms and services are covered in their respective Field Manuals.

c. References. More detailed information with reference to specialized activities relating to combat intelligence is contained in other Field Manuals of the 30-series.

For military terms not defined in this manual, see TM 20-205 and for list of training publications, see FM 21-6.

2. DEFINITIONS. **a. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A-2, or G-3, A-3.** Whenever applicable, the terms "Assistant Chief of Staff G-2," "Assistant Chief of Staff G-3" or "G-2", or "G-3" are used in this manual they will be interpreted to include the Assistant Chief of Staff A-2 or A-3 of air force units, and the intelligence officer (S-2) or operations officer (S-3) respectively, of lower units. In this connection, the basic principles of combat intelligence as set forth in this manual are applicable to air forces. However, intelligence procedure in air forces is necessarily different in some respects, and is prescribed in FM 1-40.

b. Information. Information upon which intelligence is based includes all documents, facts, or observations of any kind which may serve to throw light on an actual or possible enemy or theater of operations. (See par. 3.)

c. Military intelligence. Military intelligence is evaluated and interpreted information concerning a possible or actual enemy, or theater of operations including terrain and weather, together with conclusions drawn therefrom. (See par. 5.)

d. Evaluation of information. The evaluation of information is the examination to determine its intelligence value in terms of its credibility and reliability for possible use. (See par. 31.)

e. Interpretation of information. Interpretation of information involves an analysis to determine its probable significance in the light of intelligence already available. (See par. 32.)

f. Enemy order of battle. Enemy order of battle is the manner in which the enemy has organized and disposed his military forces. (See par. 4.)

g. Organization. Organization deals primarily with the authorized organization and equipment of units, their actual organization and equipment as encountered in the field, the command organization, the recruiting and replacement systems and a study of the formation and employment of task forces.

h. Dispositions. Dispositions consist essentially of the spot location of each identified unit within the sphere of the order of battle together with the estimated location of units known or believed to exist but as yet unidentified.

i. Enemy capabilities. In any situation a commander considers as enemy capabilities the lines of action of which the enemy is physically capable which will affect the accomplishment of his mission. (See par. 16.)

j. Estimate of enemy situation. A G-2 estimate of the enemy situation is an estimate made to determine the enemy capabilities, and when appropriate, the priority in which he may adopt them. (See par. 35.)

k. Essential elements of information. Essential elements of information (EEI) consist of the information of the enemy, of the terrain not under our control, or of the meteorological conditions in territory held by the enemy which a commander needs to make a sound decision, conduct a maneuver, avoid surprise, or formulate details of his plan. (See par. 16).

l. Indications. Indications are those evidences or manifestations of enemy activity, either positive or negative, which may point toward the adoption of a particular line of action by the enemy. They are arrived at by a detailed analysis of the essential elements of information and include all details needed to

obtain the information to answer essential elements of information. They include the dispositions and actions of the enemy; that is, how he and the terrain will appear and what he will be doing if he is adopting, or will adopt, the line of action referred to by a particular essential element of information.

m. Defense map. A defense map is a standard map upon which enemy installations, as reported by all available sources, air, ground, and naval, have been superimposed by printing processes.

n. Target map. A target map is a standard map upon which additional grids have been superimposed to facilitate the rapid identification, designation and location of targets for all forces available.

3. INFORMATION. Information includes all documents, facts, or observations of any kind which may serve to throw light on the enemy or the theater of operations. No information should be neglected. Information which seems unimportant at first glance may, upon being compared with that already received, assume primary importance. The value of information is increased when the circumstances concerning its origin, including the time at which it was obtained, are known. It should be noted that negative information is often of great value. It may sometimes be more important than positive information.

4. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE. a. General. Enemy order of battle is the manner in which the enemy has organized and disposed his military forces. The object of the study of enemy order of battle is to determine what enemy forces exist, their strength and how they are organized and disposed. Order of battle is classi-

fied as either strategic or tactical. There is no hard and fast rule by which it can be determined where strategic order of battle ends and where tactical order of battle begins; however, the following may be accepted as a general rule. Strategic order of battle includes all the enemy's military forces regardless of where they are disposed. Where the enemy is deployed within definite areas such as within the zone of action of an army group, army, corps, division, or lower unit, the order of battle is classified as "tactical," and is maintained by the intelligence section of the headquarters concerned. Information derived from tactical order of battle is a primary source for the compilation of strategic order of battle. Strategic order of battle contributes materially to the determination of tactical order of battle by furnishing reference data. In addition, strategic order of battle is the means of coordinating the tactical order of battle between headquarters in widespread or separated areas. The operations by which the enemy order of battle is determined are identical for both types; the differences are of scope and the detail involved.

b. Factors involved. To determine the enemy order of battle, a consideration of the following three principal factors is essential: Strength, organization, and disposition.

(1) Strength is, in the first instance, the total numerical strength of the enemy's military forces or of all enemy forces in an area, a theater or section of the front which is under consideration. In a broader sense, it includes the total number of enemy units as a whole and by classification, that is, infantry, armored, signal, transport, or other arm or service, the

numerical strength of each unit in personnel, weapons and equipment, and their combat efficiency. Their combat efficiency is the fighting value of the represented strength and is determined by a consideration of the organization, weapons and equipment, strength, supply, losses, wastage, leadership, training, combat experience, personnel, and morale. In presenting the factor of strength the intelligence officer must avoid giving a false picture by simply listing the units identified. He must make every effort to show the actual combat strength of each unit at the time, since often skeleton units will be identified.

(2) Organization deals primarily with the authorized organization and equipment of units, their actual organization and equipment as encountered in the field, the command organization, the recruiting and replacement systems and a study of the formation and employment of task forces. In addition, it involves determining the identity of the component elements of all organized units. For example, it includes determining the identity of the component units of divisions and the identity of army, corps, and separate and independent units.

(3) Disposition consists essentially of the spot location of each identified unit within the sphere of the order of battle together with the estimated location of units known or believed to exist but as yet unidentified. It also includes the plotting of probable boundaries between units, the study of movements and groupings and the chain of command existing within the sphere of the order of battle.

(4) In the case of air order of battle, particular emphasis is placed on number and type of enemy air-

craft, their location, and production capacity for replacement of losses.

c. System. In studying the enemy order of battle it is also necessary to maintain data on means of identification, unit histories, and military personalities.

(1) Means of identification usually employed involve a knowledge of unit designations, special designations, such as code names and numbers, post office numbers, emblems, and the commanders of units.

(2) A unit history includes all information having a bearing on the combat efficiency of the unit. Such items as origin, identification, home district and station, organization and equipment, strength, commanders, training, service record, replacement unit, personnel, and morale are included.

(3) In the study of military personalities the following items are considered for the purpose of assisting in the determination of the order of battle and estimating enemy capabilities: Present command or position, past commands and positions, present location, origin, background and training, military speciality, preferential tactics, stereotyped operations, political sympathy, personal characteristics, and personal associates.

d. Additional factors. The order of battle expert's knowledge of terrain, weather, logistics, and tactics is an additional factor which contributes to the determination of the order of battle by providing a sound basis for evaluation and interpretation.

e. Personnel. Order of battle personnel are either assigned or attached to ground force intelligence sections down to and including the division.

5. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. Military intelligence is evaluated and interpreted information concerning a possible or actual enemy, or theater of operations, including terrain and weather, together with the conclusions drawn therefrom. It includes information concerning enemy capabilities or possible lines of action open to him, as well as all that relates to the territory controlled by him or subject to his influence. Based upon its source, military intelligence is divided into two general classes: Combat intelligence and War Department intelligence. There is no rigid distinction between these two classes, as much War Department intelligence is also combat intelligence.

a. Combat intelligence. Combat intelligence is the military intelligence produced in the field, after the outbreak of hostilities, by the military intelligence sections of all tactical headquarters. In support of theaters the War Department contributes to combat intelligence. Usually this class of intelligence is confined to the terrain and to location, strength, composition, dispositions, movements, armament, equipment, supply, tactics, training, discipline, and morale of the enemy forces opposing a combat unit and the deductions made from a consideration of these factors. In the army and higher organizations, it includes the broader aspects of military intelligence of particular importance in strategical decisions. Commanders must be certain that they base their action, dispositions and plans upon *estimates of the enemy capabilities rather than upon estimates of the enemy's intentions*. The estimate of the enemy capabilities can be formulated, based upon the knowledge of his strength, dispositions, activities, organization, and means. Enemy intentions

can seldom be determined because the enemy commander may change his mind frequently or higher commanders may change his orders. Furthermore, the enemy can promulgate false orders and rumors, which in themselves would indicate an action different from that which he actually intends. The enemy may also institute measures to give a false impression of his capabilities. It will be more difficult to do this than to spread erroneous information concerning his intentions. The commander must base his actions on calculated risks. The risks are less if the commander bases his decision on an estimate of the enemy capabilities rather than on his own or his intelligence officer's estimate of the enemy intentions.

b. War Department intelligence. (1) War Department intelligence is generally the military intelligence produced under the direction of the War Department General Staff in peace and in war. Some of this intelligence is combat intelligence in that it supports theaters in their operations. Every country and possible theater of operations is studied. These studies include composition, distribution, fighting quality, organization, armament, equipment, tactical and supply methods of the armed forces; the personalities of high commanders; resources in manpower and material, and the period of time required to convert these to military use; economic and political conditions and aspirations; history and national psychology; and military geography, topography, and climatic conditions. This intelligence furnishes the basis for projected operations and for changes in organization, training, armament, equipment, and supplies to meet the tactical methods of a particular enemy, possible or actual.

(2) The Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff is responsible for keeping this intelligence up to date and for issuing necessary maps, monographs, and reports to the field forces whenever required by them.

(3) The major commands are responsible for maintaining up-to-date compilations of information on the various foreign armies concerning their respective arms or services in such condition that they can be reproduced and distributed upon short notice. In other cases the major commands make arrangements with the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff to compile these data.

6. INTELLIGENCE IN HIGHER UNITS. a. General.

During planning phases, large headquarters have responsibilities toward lower units similar to those of the War Department toward theaters in their formative periods. Theater G-2's establish means and methods for collecting all information of potential value for future operations and coordinate the efforts of subordinate agencies. They also coordinate theater work with that of the War Department, Navy and Allies, where applicable. The importance of this over-all, long-range intelligence responsibility cannot be over-emphasized. The operation and organization of theater intelligence should be such that a maximum of intelligence can be presented to any task force planning staff when an operation in a particular area is decided, together with as much of the necessary augmentation of personnel and equipment required by the task force as can be reasonably anticipated.

b. Intelligence specialists. Tables of Organization and Equipment are necessarily such that additional intelligence personnel and equipment are usually required for specific missions. This addition normally includes a variety of intelligence specialists. Time is always required to select and train such personnel whether in the United States or in the theater, and it is normally a theater responsibility to anticipate requirements on a sound and reasonable basis.

c. Terrain intelligence. Terrain intelligence of all types, including maps, terrain studies, target information, and meteorological studies must be accumulated on a long-range basis. In many areas, this terrain intelligence depends primarily on air photography. The theater or similar commander has the key responsibility in this respect, particularly for coordinating requirements of air, ground, and amphibious forces. It is his function to designate requirements and to require the accomplishment of necessary air photography by the air commander. The G-2 of a theater or similar command must analyze requirements and make appropriate recommendations for command decision.

d. Liaison. The long-range preparation and planning for which the G-2 of a higher headquarters is responsible can be made more effective if many personal contacts with the G-2's of lower echelons are made. By personal visits as well as formal conferences, the G-2 becomes acquainted with intelligence officers of subordinate units and their methods of work. He discovers their special abilities and individual weaknesses. This preparation for combat intelligence in battle is probably as valuable as any other preparatory step that can be taken.

7. INTELLIGENCE IN LOWER UNITS. a. Preparation.

Prior to assignment of a definite mission to a lower unit, its intelligence agencies are employed as follows:

(1) Training.

(2) Temporary assignment to higher echelons for general planning, for example, in pools of interrogators, translators, interpreters, and photo interpreters.

(3) Working on the over-all program, for example, topographic units are assigned portions of the theater mapping program.

(4) Developing intelligence plans for specific missions, as directed by higher headquarters.

b. Planning. Responsibility for its own intelligence planning starts within a unit immediately upon assignment of the mission. The extent of prior planning by higher headquarters varies but, in any case, each commander is responsible for his own unit, whether by his own means or by request upon other headquarters. Prompt and positive action is required for obtaining all intelligence necessary to the unit. All intelligence including that received from higher headquarters must be adapted to the needs of the unit; normally it is inappropriate merely to republish that received from higher or lower headquarters.

8. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN COMMANDER'S DECISION. a. General.

The commander's decision is based upon the mission as affected by the following:

(1) Enemy to be dealt with in accomplishing the mission.

(2) Terrain over which the operation must be conducted.

(3) Weather to the extent that it may affect the operation.

(4) Means available for the execution of the mission within the time limitations.

b. Requirements for Intelligence. Before making a decision initiating action designed to accomplish his mission, the commander will need information concerning the unknown factors, enemy, terrain, and weather; having made a decision, he will require information which will permit him to continue projected operations and accomplish his mission regardless of what the enemy may do, or to make a new decision in view of the changed situation. Military intelligence thus plays a direct part in every decision. Consequently, for each decision of the commander there should be, whenever appropriate, an intelligence plan designed to coordinate the search for definite information which the particular situation demands. (See par. 15.)

9. OBJECT OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE. a. Primary objective. The primary object of combat intelligence is to reduce as far as possible uncertainties regarding the enemy, terrain, and weather and thus assist the commander in making a decision and the troops in executing their assigned missions.

b. Secondary objective. The secondary object of combat intelligence is to assist the commander in the formulation and supervision of counterintelligence measures designed to conceal our own intentions and activities and to defeat measures adopted by the enemy for the purpose of influencing our own actions. (See FM 30-25.)

10. DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN OBTAINING ADE- QUATE INFORMATION.

The difficulties involved in obtaining adequate information and in arriving at reliable conclusions based thereon are many. These difficulties are due principally to the fact that the interests of the enemy demand that he shall make every possible effort to foil our attempts to gain information. He will conceal his movements by night marches and counterintelligence measures involving the use of both ground and air agencies; he will make use of ground, cover, and weather conditions to conceal his movements and will supplement natural cover with camouflage; he will resort to any tactical measures that offer a reasonable chance of obtaining secrecy or surprise; he will enforce a strict censorship and enforce cryptographic security measures to prevent leaks of information; he may distribute false information and institute measures to deceive our collecting agencies; and he will sometimes adopt a course of action that may appear illogical. The opposition of the enemy's interest to our own, as well as the independence of his will, must necessarily make him more or less an unknown factor in every situation. To a lesser degree, the terrain not under our control and weather conditions also are unknown factors.

SECTION II

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION

11. UNIT COMMANDER. Since intelligence constitutes a vital element in the commander's estimate of the situation leading to a decision, it is a basic function of command to initiate and coordinate the search for the necessary information. In addition, a commander may receive reconnaissance missions or demands for specific information from higher authority as well as requests for information from lower and neighboring units. These may or may not coincide with his own requirements for information. In any case, each commander is responsible for obtaining all military information which is essential to his own unit, whether by his own means or by requests on higher or neighboring headquarters. Conversely, within his own zone of operations he is responsible for collecting such information as is requested by higher headquarters, and so far as practicable, such as is requested by lower and neighboring units. By this system a commander, with due regard to the mobility of any forces that the enemy may possibly possess, particularly mechanized, motorized, airborne and waterborne, is enabled to extend his search for information in sufficient depth and width to guard against surprise.

12. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2—DUTIES. a. General duties. Under the supervision of the chief of staff or unit commander, the intelligence officer is

charged with the planning and preparation of orders and to some extent with operations pertaining to the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and distribution of information of the enemy and with counterintelligence activities. His primary function is to keep his commander, and all others concerned, informed regarding the enemy situation and capabilities, and the terrain and weather. He assists his commander in determining the essential elements of information.

b. Specific duties. Specific duties of intelligence officers are listed in FM 101-5.

13. DUAL FUNCTIONS. The military intelligence section is one of the coordinate sections of every general staff and of similarly organized staffs. It has operative functions as well as general staff functions which vary in scope with the size of the command. In task forces, army and higher headquarters they include propaganda, counterpropaganda, censorship, control of visitors, counterespionage, espionage, and related activities.

14. PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION. The intelligence section should be able to handle information of a scope commensurate with the size and mission of the command. It should be so organized and equipped that it will fit into the living and working conditions of the command in all situations while retaining the essential degree of mobility. In the division and lower combat units, the primary functions of the intelligence section are the collection, collation, evaluation, and interpretation of information, and prompt dissemination of combat intelligence. The organization should be simple;

methods employed should insure speed; and facilities available at headquarters should be appropriate to the unit and the arm concerned. Complete details of operation are contained in the Field Manuals for the respective arms. For charts showing suggested organization of intelligence sections for combat see the appendix.

15. PRODUCTION OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE. The production of combat intelligence is a continuing process consisting of logical steps. When a unit is assigned to a theater of operations, its intelligence officer should initiate a terrain study and a study of the situation in the theater. The intelligence officer should be prepared to advise the commander as to the essential elements of information to be issued as a part of his directive. (See par. 16b.) After the essential elements of information have been issued, the intelligence officer prepares the G-2 plan. Based upon the plan he prepares orders for the execution of the plan subject to the approval of his commander. These orders may be issued as part of an intelligence annex or they may be issued separately as well as in the intelligence annex. Based upon the information secured as a result of the publication of the orders or as a result of the operations of standing operating procedure, the intelligence officer makes a continuing estimate of the enemy situation. During action the intelligence officer revises the intelligence plan, the orders, and his estimate of the situation. He issues estimates, periodic reports, or summaries as required, in which he may discuss the relative priority of adoption of the enemy capabilities when such a discussion

is warranted. The information as it comes in is continuously collated in the journal, work sheet, order of battle records, situation map, target map, and defense map. In addition to supervising the production of combat intelligence, the intelligence officer must visit higher, lower, and adjacent units.

SECTION III

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

16. COORDINATION. The ability of the enemy to act in various ways and the limited and diverse nature of information gathering agencies available to the commander require an understanding of enemy capabilities and the most careful coordination of all intelligence activities.

a. Enemy capabilities. (1) In any situation, the lines of action of which the enemy is physically capable and which if adopted will affect the accomplishment of our mission, are called the "enemy capabilities" for that particular situation. The term "capabilities" includes not only the general lines of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular lines of action possible under each general line of action. For example, under the general line of action of an attack, the various particular lines of action possible are an attack today, an attack tomorrow, an envelopment of our left flank, an uncoordinated attack against our front, etc.

(2) In order that the commander may arrive at a new decision or decide to adhere to an old one, he must from time to time, make an estimate of the situation. As an essential part of such an estimate, he must obtain, ordinarily from G-2, factual data as to the combat strength of the enemy confronting him and as to the possible strength and time of arrival of reinforcements. In addition, the commander with the

assistance of G-2 must arrive at conclusions relative to the enemy's capabilities and the effect of means available, time, space, terrain, and other conditions upon each of these. (See par. 34.) The commander will be concerned with the enemy capabilities which might either interfere with or favor the accomplishment of his mission or plans.

(3) The commander's initial decision must be supplemented by other decisions as the action progresses. These decisions must be based on a narrowing down of the enemy capabilities previously considered. Accordingly, intelligence activities should be so directed as to investigate each capability with a view to finally determining which of his capabilities the enemy is actually adopting. This can be accomplished only by obtaining information which gradually eliminates certain capabilities and eventually enables G-2 to determine the line of action the enemy has adopted. If this process is based upon faulty interpretation or upon inadequate or inaccurate information, there is always danger that the enemy may gain surprise.

b. Essential elements of information. (1) The essential elements of information consist of that information of the enemy, of the terrain not under our control, or of meteorological conditions which a commander needs to make a sound decision, conduct a maneuver, avoid surprise, or formulate details of a plan of operations. The essential elements are designated for the purpose of focusing the attention and activities of all collecting agencies on that information which, from the viewpoint of the commander, is necessary at a particular time. They include questions as to—

(a) Enemy capabilities which can interfere with or favor our operations, elaborated upon as to details of time, place and strength.

(b) Strength, composition, dispositions of the enemy's major units.

(c) Reinforcement of the enemy.

(d) Terrain controlled by the enemy.

(e) Natural or artificial obstacles.

(f) Information desired by higher, lower or adjacent units.

(2) It is the duty of the commander to obtain correct information bearing upon his mission and to insure coordination of all collecting agencies at his disposal. He is therefore responsible for the designation of essential elements of information. He makes basic decisions and exercises the continuing supervision which insure that the intelligence effort is directed along proper lines. In determining essential elements, however, he is assisted by his chief of staff and G-2. G-2 should study continuously in collaboration with other members of the staff, particularly G-3, our own and the enemy situation, possible lines of action open to the enemy, and the influence of terrain and other local conditions upon these lines of action. Based on this study, G-2 should at all times be prepared to recommend to the commander the essential elements of information and to give the important considerations governing their selection.

(3) For purposes of orientation, either the commander in his directive or G-2 should acquaint the staff with the essential elements and with any modifications of them. If an intelligence annex is issued the essential elements are stated therein.

(4) Essential elements of information relating to the enemy capabilities should be stated as direct questions concerning enemy capabilities, elaborated as to specific details of time, place, and strength, when appropriate. It should be clearly understood that no guess as to the enemy intentions is desired, but that a search is to be directed for the facts which will disclose, progressively, the confirmation or elimination of adoption by the enemy of the capabilities to which the inquiries relate. Essential elements of information may also be in the form of statements of the information required. If they are stated in this form, it should be understood that the statement does not constitute a complete mission assigned to a specific collecting agency. Essential elements of information announced by higher headquarters are not repeated by a lower headquarters unless they also pertain to its particular mission or situation. The information which a headquarters has been ordered to secure by a higher headquarters, or requested to secure by an adjacent unit, may be announced as essential elements of information.

17. INFORMATION NOT LIMITED TO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. The essential elements of information are guides governing the search for information and not limitations regulating the information to be reported. Therefore, collecting agencies will transmit all enemy information of importance which comes to their attention.

18. NATURE OF INFORMATION REQUIRED. In order to determine the type of information required to an-

swer the essential elements of information, G-2 must understand the object and scope of the study and the sources and significance of information. The following are some of the considerations he should take into account.

a. Study of terrain. (1) *Sources of information.*

The sources of information for a study of the terrain include maps; vertical and oblique air photographs; personal reconnaissance when possible; troops, particularly cavalry and air forces; inhabitants and agents; enemy documents; and geographical reports from higher headquarters.

(2) *Responsibility.* G-2 is responsible for the study of the terrain from the point of view of the enemy, and the collection of information as to the terrain and meteorological conditions in territory held by the enemy. He should call upon the unit engineer, when one is available, to assist in the preparation of terrain studies.

(3) Estimate of terrain held by us from viewpoint of enemy.

(a) Based upon his knowledge of the enemy situation and of the enemy's probable knowledge of our own situation, G-2 should determine the favorable and unfavorable effects of the terrain on all possible lines of action which may be adopted by the enemy.

(b) For operations of the corps and lower units, the estimate is prepared after a detailed study of observation, fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles (natural and artificial), and communications. Preparation of the estimate may be facilitated by special maps or overlays upon which stream lines, ridge lines, and obstacles have been marked plainly. Layer tinting to

bring out the details of the terrain is also of great assistance in the preparation of terrain studies.

(c) The theater as well as the War Department G-2 should give careful consideration to the influence of economic resources.

(4) *Terrain not under our control.* (a) A study of terrain not under our control should include such matters as are directly necessitated by the essential elements of information, if any, relating to the terrain. In addition, G-2 should ascertain from G-3 whether any features should be investigated with respect to their effect on details of our contemplated maneuver. This is particularly important with respect to obstacles to our maneuver, the presence or present condition of which is not known or disclosed by available maps.

(b) In the higher echelons of command, economic resources, natural and artificial obstacles, and communication within the enemy's territory will be subjects of special studies by G-2 and particularly by A-2.

(5) *Meteorological conditions.* Although meteorological conditions do not constitute a part of a terrain study, nevertheless they have such an immediate and important relation to terrain that they should be included in the study. A study of meteorological conditions will be of particular importance as affecting both friendly and enemy air operations.

b. Study of the enemy. (1) *Importance.* The enemy represents the most uncertain factor. The continuous increase in mobility of fire and speed of movement reduces the time during which any given information is of value. Improvement in means of collecting and disseminating information has not compensated for this shortening of time. The intelligence officer must

therefore exercise a continuous supervision and coordination over the search for additional information.

(2) *Information desired.* The information desired varies with the size of the unit and with the development of the situation during operations. Depending upon the situation, the following factors are of varying importance:

(a) *Distance between opposing forces.* The distance between opposing forces and the local conditions will show with what elements the enemy can engage and will indicate in a general way the line of contact under various lines of action which he may adopt.

(b) *Enemy activities.* The enemy's ground and air activities, including movements of combat elements and of service elements and supplies, entrenching, fire, and radio and other signal communications, furnish information bearing on the enemy's capabilities. Information as to movements should include strength, composition, direction, and location of heads of columns at a specified time.

(c) *Enemy dispositions.* Information of the location and strength of the hostile positions and the dispositions thereon furnishes, either directly or indirectly, indications as to enemy capabilities. Typical indications pertaining to essential elements of information dealing with various enemy lines of action are shown in paragraph 21g.

19. COLLECTING AGENCIES. a. General. Collecting agencies available to a combat unit vary with its size, facilities, and distance from the front. The battalion is the smallest ground forces unit provided with intelligence personnel. It collects its information mainly by

means of patrols, scouts, observation posts, and reports of front line companies. It may conduct a hasty examination of prisoners of war, enemy deserters, inhabitants, and documents. At the other extreme are higher headquarters which have at their disposal such facilities as air units for visual and photographic reconnaissance, radio interception, radio goniometry, secret agents, and sound and flash ranging. In air force units the squadron is the smallest unit provided with intelligence personnel. It collects its information mainly from combat crew reports and photographic interpretation. The organic collecting agencies of each combat unit are prescribed by appropriate Tables of Organization. Additional collecting agencies may be attached to units which are operating alone.

b. Agencies. Information collecting agencies available in a combat unit may include part or all of the following:

(1) *Intelligence personnel.* Intelligence personnel having special qualifications are furnished commanders either organically in Tables of Organization or as members of attached teams. This personnel functions directly under the orders of the unit intelligence officer and conducts activities which may include—

(a) *Observation posts.* In addition to the ground observation posts maintained by elements in contact with the enemy, intelligence personnel may establish and maintain observation posts.

(b) *Mission of intelligence scouts.* The sole mission of intelligence scouts, either when operating alone or in conjunction with reconnaissance patrols or raiding parties, is to gather information. They engage in combat only in furtherance of this mission.

(c) *Examination of prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, and inhabitants.* Proper examination of prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, and inhabitants furnishes valuable and accurate information concerning the enemy order of battle, organization, dispositions, plans and preparations, morale, and numerous other subjects. Specially trained interrogators conduct the examination when practicable. This subject is covered in FM 30-15.

(d) *Examination of captured documents.* This study furnishes valuable information relative to the enemy order of battle, troop movements, economic conditions, tactical doctrine, morale, and other subjects. Systematic examination of captured documents of both a personal and official nature is a function of specially trained intelligence personnel. At times they may be assisted by Signal Corps specialists in cryptography. This subject is covered in FM 30-15.

(e) *Examination of captured matériel.* Examination of captured matériel by qualified experts enables our forces to keep an accurate check on new developments and eventually leads to the adoption of new technique, tactical doctrine, or matériel to meet these developments. (See FM 30-15.)

(f) *Liaison.* Close liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent units by means of specifically designated and trained personnel, particularly during battle, facilitates the rapid and accurate transmittal of information vital to the commander concerned. At army or task force levels ground force units maintain ground liaison officers at the airfields used by cooperating air units. Tactical air forces or commands assign air liaison offi-

cers as required to ground and naval units with which they are cooperating.

(g) *Study of air photographs.* The study of air photographs by qualified specialists furnishes detailed information of great value concerning the enemy's activities.

(h) *Study of hostile and neutral press.* This study furnishes important information bearing on enemy resources, political conditions and morale, as well as information concerning recruiting, troop movements, and other subjects, even though censorship may be applied.

(i) *Espionage.* Secret agents sometimes procure accurate information of vital importance in the conduct of operations. However, information from this source will require the most careful analysis and evaluation to determine its reliability.

(2) *Troops.* (a) It is the continuing duty of every combat unit to secure all possible information of the enemy and to report such information to higher and affected adjacent commands with the least possible delay. In the absence of positive information, negative information should be reported. In addition to this continuing duty, intelligence missions may be assigned to troop units, directing them to gain certain definite information required by the commander.

(b) In addition to the collection of documents found on enemy dead and on prisoners, arrangements should be made for the collection of all printed matter or manuscripts found in places lately occupied by the enemy. Immediately following occupation of a town or village, steps should be taken to seize vacated enemy headquarters, post and telegraph offices, telephone exchanges, police stations, and government and municipal

offices in order to prevent the destruction of valuable documents and records.

(c) Troop units maintain continuous observation over areas immediately to the front by means of ground observation and by air observation when aviation is available. Visual observation should be supplemented by air photographs.

(d) It is frequently necessary to engage in combat for the specific purpose of obtaining information.

(3) *Special information services.* These services are in general technical and are frequently operated primarily in the interest of the arms to which they pertain. They are not under direct supervision of the intelligence section. However, close cooperation and liaison are maintained between these agencies and the intelligence section which should be furnished with all information procured. These services include—

(a) *Tactical air reconnaissance.* For the details of cooperation between intelligence sections of various ground forces units and tactical air reconnaissance units, see current training literature on this subject.

(b) *Field artillery intelligence section.* (See FM 6-130.) Each echelon of command in the field artillery from the battalion up is provided with a staff section charged with intelligence matters and which operates in close coordination with all other similar sections. The general sources of information available to these sections are:

1. Field artillery observation posts.
2. Forward observers.
3. Liaison officers with supported units.
4. Information from patrols.
5. Organic and tactical air observation.

6. Maps and air photographs.
7. Interrogation of prisoners of war and civilians.
8. Radar locaters.
9. Radio interception.
10. Reports from adjacent and higher units.
11. Observation battalions—sound and flash ranging.
12. Shell reports.

(c) *Air intelligence.* In addition to other intelligence activities, the air forces produce air photographs for intelligence and mapping purposes and prepare and disseminate meteorological data.

(d) *Antiaircraft intelligence service.* The antiaircraft intelligence service employs observation and special instruments for the detection of aircraft.

(e) *Signal intelligence.* In the army and higher headquarters, the signal intelligence service includes telegraph and telephone listening stations, radio interception and goniometry, and laboratories for the solution of codes, ciphers, and secret inks. Information from signal intelligence units will be derived principally in the following ways:

1. By the location of enemy wireless stations a schematic diagram of the enemy's signal organization, and hence the general dispositions of his forces, may be compiled.
2. By observation and analysis of the enemy's signal procedure in the transmission and handling of messages, individual stations may be identified, or changes in the composition, organization, and dispositions of the enemy's forces deduced.

3. By reading the actual addresses and texts of messages transmitted by the enemy, information may be obtained concerning the enemy order of battle, plans, dispositions, movements, or other activities.

(f) *Engineer intelligence.* In addition to normal intelligence activities, the engineers collect data for preparation or correction of maps and in stabilized situations operate a listening service for the detection of mining by the enemy. Engineer reconnaissance sections perform route reconnaissance.

(g) *Chemical intelligence.* In addition to the chemical intelligence furnished by unit gas officers and chemical officers of divisions or higher units, the chemical laboratory company will maintain an active intelligence section. It will investigate and report on all matters of a chemical nature referred thereto; test friendly and enemy chemical warfare equipment; and identify new chemical agents and recommend protection against them.

c. Additional agencies. Higher and adjacent units frequently have means for collecting information not available in a particular unit. Close liaison should be established with these organizations for the purpose of obtaining all pertinent information.

d. Developments. The adaptation of new scientific developments of war is gradually making the task of G-2 more complex; at the same time, however, it affords him additional means for the collection of information. Every new invention that may possibly be used as an information gathering or transmitting device should be tested immediately for this purpose.

20. INTELLIGENCE PLAN. The essential elements of information (EEI) having been announced, it is necessary that definite and precise instructions for obtaining the required information be given to the collecting agencies or that higher or adjacent headquarters be requested to furnish it. To avoid any possibility of omission or conflict, the intelligence officer must follow a logical, orderly process in analyzing and transforming the essential elements of information into missions or requests, in allotting the missions to collecting agencies, and in designating the time and the place where information is to be reported. A form for a detailed intelligence plan and a form for an abbreviated plan are shown in figures 1 and 2. The discussion in the subsequent paragraphs refers to the completion of the detailed form. Ordinarily the abbreviated form will be found more convenient when speed is required. Figure 4 presents the situation upon which the plan is based. Figure 5 shows a partially completed intelligence plan. The scope of the intelligence plan depends upon the sphere of action of the commander for whom it is drawn.

a. Period covered. The plan should be prepared to cover the period of operation required by the mission of the commander concerned. It will be subsequently modified to conform to new decisions made by the commander during the development of the situation.

b. Essential elements of information (Column 1). In this column are listed the essential elements of information as announced for the projected operations or situation.

INTELLIGENCE (G-2) PLAN

Period covered: From:

To:

(1) Essential elements of information	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action	(4) Agencies to be employed*						Hour and destination at which information is to be reported

* All agencies should be listed.

Figure 1.

INTELLIGENCE (G-2) PLAN (Abbreviated Form)

Period covered: From:

To:

Essential elements of information	Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	Agencies to be employed*							Hour and destination at which information is to be reported

* All agencies should be listed.

Note. Missions to secure the information shown in Indications are assigned in orders to collecting agencies. This may be accomplished by fragmentary messages.

Figure 2.

c. Indications (analysis of essential elements of information) (Column 2). In this column, G-2 briefly records the results of his analysis of the essential elements of information, setting down as *indications* items that would be needed to answer, affirmatively, the questions asked or implied by the wording of the essential elements. The object of this analysis is to break down the essential elements into indications of possible enemy action that will furnish the basis for definite reconnaissance missions. The G-2 performs the analysis by picturing to himself what the enemy will have to do or may do to carry out the capability referred to by the particular essential element of information being analyzed. He records as indications the way the enemy and terrain will appear while the enemy is doing these things. Certain essential elements will require very little analysis by the intelligence officer in order to transform them into suitable reconnaissance missions. If the information to be obtained gives a direct answer to the inquiry contained in an essential element, analysis is unnecessary. For example, essential elements of information relating to the existence of natural obstacles usually require no analysis other than a map study, supplemented by information from other sources, to determine whether or not the obstacles exist. Others, however, must be subjected to careful analysis in order to determine what indications must be sought to answer the inquiries contained therein. (See fig. 3.)

d. Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action (Column 3). Having analyzed the essential elements of information and having recorded the indications corresponding to each, G-2 next writes the




Figure 3. Indications of enemy preparations for defense.

basis for the specific orders for the collecting agencies and the requests to be made on higher or adjacent units. He also makes such other notes for future action which cannot be covered in an order or request to an agency. The actual orders and requests are then prepared from notes contained in this column. Often two or more of these entries may be combined into one message or paragraph of an order to an agency. In order that he may give each agency, in accordance with its characteristics and limitations, specific instructions as to exactly what information is to be secured, and where it is to be sought, G-2 must make a careful study of the situation map. Several agencies may be utilized in establishing but one definite fact bearing on an essential element of information.

e. Agencies to be employed (Column 4). In this column, G-2 lists, in the space provided at the top, all agencies available and assigns missions of collecting information (or requests for information) bearing on the indications of enemy action, by checking the agency or agencies which have this information or to which he will look for obtaining it. To utilize properly the available collecting agencies or other sources in the search for information, it is essential that G-2 be thoroughly familiar with their powers and limitations and cooperate closely with G-3. Care must be taken to prevent overloading an agency with missions, and in selecting the agencies best suited to get the information desired. Wherever possible, more than one agency or source of information should be used in obtaining each item required.

f. Hour and destination at which information is to be reported (Column 5). From a knowledge of the

plan of operations gained by close cooperation with G-3, G-2 determines when and where necessary information must be reported in order to be of use to the commander. In determining the time at which information must be available, G-2 is guided by the fact that information arriving too late is of no value, and information arriving in advance of its actual need is likely to be inaccurate at the time when projected operations are undertaken. In determining when information must be reported the intelligence officer must consider the time factor in issuing necessary orders in all echelons of command involved in the mission, the time required to execute the mission and to report its results.

g. Guide to preparation of intelligence plan. (1)

The following guide (pp. 40 to 48 inclusive) illustrates proper procedure in developing indications from essential elements of information and in turn reducing the basic indications to a basis for specific missions to collecting agencies.

(2) The indications listed therein are not complete to fit all situations. The intelligence officer must know enemy tactics, methods, and limitations as well as the peculiarities of the specific enemy opposing his unit, in order to formulate sound indications and issue effective orders and directives. Indications listed below will, however, serve as a guide to orderly planning and thinking.

(3) The "Basis for Specific Orders and Requests" is used in the preparation of orders to collecting agencies. Consequently, statements in the right-hand column on the following form must be as specific as possible and require the reporting of information (not opinions).

h. Example of sample plan (figs. 4 and 5). In figure 4 the 1st Infantry Division has an offensive mission. Indications of enemy defense have been discovered. Plans for an attack against the enemy's south flank are being prepared. The following essential elements of information have been announced:

(1) Will the enemy defend the Bonneville Ridge? If so, what will be his dispositions, particularly the location of the flanks of his organized position and the strength and location of his reserves?

(2) Will the enemy withdraw from his present position and occupy another position west of South Branch Conewago Creek? If so, when, where, and in what strength?

(3) Will the enemy delay in successive positions? If so, what will be his positions? (Particular attention to South Branch Conewago Creek between Newchester and Chestnut Hill School.)

(4) Will the enemy attack the 1st Division? If so, when, with what forces, and from what direction?

(5) Will the enemy be reinforced? If so, when, where, with what forces and from what direction?

(6) Are there any key terrain features not shown on available maps, particularly in zone of attack?

(7) Are there any obstacles to our maneuver? If so, what and where?

The same intelligence plan (fig. 5) is developed partially for the first EEI.

GUIDE TO PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE PLAN

EEI dealing with—	Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	Explanation	Basis for specific orders and requests (facts to be reported on by collecting agencies)
1. ATTACK.	a. Establishment of counter-reconnaissance screen.	(1) Counterreconnaissance screens (Inf-Cav) are used to cover possible assembly areas, routes of troop movement, or regrouping of forces to be used in an attack.	(a) Location enemy elements beyond which you are unable to penetrate. Particularly along line —
	b. Movement of hostile units forward.	(1) Prior to launching an attack troops may be moved to assembly areas from which they can deploy.	(a) Movement of hostile units towards possible assembly areas vicinity of (b) Movement hostile unit along road(s)
	c. Location of enemy troops in forward assembly areas.	(1) Location of enemy assembly areas from which an attack can be launched.	(a) Location bodies of troops in area — —
	d. Location of artillery well forward.	(1) Disposition of artillery in areas from which it can support an attack. Artillery located well forward, and generally in line.	(a) Location, type, and caliber of artillery vicinity (b) Location, type, and caliber of artillery in area(s) — —
	e. Increased patrolling.	(1) Patrolling by infantry and cavalry is usually more active prior to an attack.	(a) Number, size, activity Infantry and Cavalry patrols in area — —

f. Enemy units disposed on relatively narrow frontages.	(1) The yardstick is the normal frontage of the battalion in the attack.	(a) Location flanks enemy units along line — —
g. Covering forces being reinforced or replaced by new units.	(1) Cavalry being replaced or reinforced by infantry may indicate an attack.	(a) New identifications, particular attention infantry and armored units. (b) Cavalry identifications. (c) Location infantry and cavalry, particularly along line —
h. Increased activity rear areas.	(1) Prior to an attack, supply and administrative activities generally increase in the rear areas.	(a) Numbers, type, movement, and direction of traffic in area
i. Location CPs, supply and evacuation installations well forward.	(1) CPs, supply and evacuation installations usually located well forward for an attack.	(a) Location CPs, supply and evacuation establishment. (b) Supply and evacuation installations vicinity
j. Registration of hostile field artillery fire upon points within our defensive position.	(1) Hostile field artillery may register preliminary to artillery preparation in support of the attack.	(a) Shell reports from subordinate units.
k. Increased air reconnaissance.	(1) Air reconnaissance is usually more active prior to an attack.	(a) Reports as to the amount and type of air activity over our position.

GUIDE TO PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE PLAN—Continued

EEI dealing with—	Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	Explanation	Basis for specific orders and requests (facts to be reported on by collecting agencies)
	1. Systematic air bombardment.	(1) Preliminary to the attack, the enemy may engage in systematic "softening up" of our position by bombardment.	(a) Reports as to the amount and type of air activity over our position.
2. DEFENSE.	a. Presence of demolitions, gassed areas, obstacles, and minefields.	(1) The installing or presence of demolitions and minefields, etc., covering approaches to enemy position is additional protection.	(a) Location and extent of demolitions, gassed areas, obstacles, minefields, front and flanks present position. (b) Installation demolitions, gassed areas, obstacles, minefields along line — (c) Installation demolitions, gassed areas, obstacles, minefields on high ground —
	b. Deployment of infantry on good defensive terrain.	(1) Dominating terrain having good fields of fire is usually selected by infantry for a defensive position.	(a) Location infantry on high ground along — (b) Location infantry along river.
	c. Dumping ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment to include fortification of buildings.	(1) Engineer tools and equipment may be used in the digging of trenches and erection of obstacles.	(a) Dumping ammunition or engineer supplies and equipment on present location. (b) Dumping ammunition or engineer supplies and equipment on

	d. Entrenching and erection of bands of wire.	(1) Digging of trenches and the erection of wire would probably mean the enemy was preparing to hold his present position.	(a) Entrenching and erection of wire on present position. (b) Entrenching and erection of wire on (c) Entrenching and erection of wire along line —
	e. Artillery disposed in depth. (To include AT weapons.)	(1) Artillery is usually disposed in depth and located centrally to support a defensive position.	(a) Location of artillery. (b) Location of artillery in area — —
	f. Reserves located to support the defense.	(1) Reserves are usually located in a position where they can be used on either flank to strengthen or counterattack.	(a) Location of troops in rear present line of contact. (b) Troops located in area — —
	g. Movement to rear of troops previously located in forward areas.	(1) Reconnaissance and covering forces may withdraw to the flanks or move to locations within the defensive position.	(a) Movement of hostile units along road
	h. Location CPs, supply and evacuation installations to rear.	(1) CPs, supply and evacuation installations usually located well to the rear out of reach of long-range artillery fire.	(a) Location CPs, supply and evacuation installations. (b) Supply and evacuation installations vicinity
3. WITH-DRAWAL.	a. Rearward movement of supply and evacuation installations.	(1) Movement of these installations to the rear would generally indicate the forces which they were supporting were to move rearward.	(a) Movement of supply and evacuation installations to the rear. (b) Location supply and evacuation installations. (c) Movement of fully loaded supply vehicles to the rear.

GUIDE TO PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE PLAN—Continued

EEI dealing with—	Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	Explanation	Basis for specific orders and requests (facts to be reported on by collecting agencies)
	b. Movement of small elements straight to the rear from the front line.	(1) Small bodies of troops often assemble into larger groups (platoons, companies, and battalions) out of effective range of small arms before a general withdrawal.	(a) Movement small bodies of troops straight to rear.
	c. Movement of larger units to the rear.	(1) Large bodies of troops moving to rear would indicate the enemy was to occupy a position further to the rear or a complete withdrawal.	(a) Movement large bodies of troops to rear. (b) Movement large bodies of troops along road —
	d. Movement to and occupation by reserves of positions in rear of or on flanks of the initial position.	(1) Troops located in these positions can cover the withdrawal as well as counterattack pursuing forces.	(a) Location of troops in rear or on flanks of present position. (b) Troops located in area —
	e. Organization of defensive positions in rear.	(1) Entrenching, barbed wire, obstacles on suitable terrain to the rear indicates the enemy may occupy that position.	(a) Entrenching, erection of wire on — (b) Dumping engineer supplies and equipment on —

f. Extensive demolitions, obstacles, minefields, gassed areas behind or on flanks of line of present contact.	(1) This action could indicate preparations for delaying our pursuit when the enemy moved to the rear.	(a) Demolitions, minefields, obstacles, gassed areas behind present line of contact. (b) Demolitions, minefields, obstacles, gassed areas along line — —
g. Loss of contact by any element.	(1) Withdrawal of enemy may be preceded by our loss of contact with enemy elements at points along the line.	(a) Loss of contact.
h. Rearward displacement of artillery by echelon.	(1) Artillery units are often displaced by echelon to protect the covering force and furnish protection for new positions.	(a) Movement of artillery between and (b) Location and strength of artillery in area (c) Number of batteries at (last known position).
i. Local counterattacks by both ground and air forces.	(1) Counterattacks and air attacks may be used to cover disengagement.	(a) Strength, composition, and location of counterattacks against subordinate units. (b) Strength and type of air attacks against subordinate units.
j. The use of smoke.	(1) Delaying forces may disengage under cover of smoke or darkness.	(a) Location and size of smoke screens in area(s) —

GUIDE TO PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE PLAN—Continued

EEI dealing with—	Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	Explanation	Basis for specific orders and requests (facts to be reported on by collecting agencies)
4. DELAYING ACTION.	Same as WITHDRAWAL, with the following additions: a. Enemy disposed on a broad front with little depth.	(1) Early development of maximum fire power for short periods may increase delay. (2) Disposition on a broad front will allow enemy to oppose encircling forces on routes leading to his rear.	(a) Location of reserves and organization of the ground in areas — (b) Examine air photographs of area in rear of the line of contact.
	b. Weapons and artillery well forward, disposed to engage us at maximum ranges.	(1) Development of maximum fire power initially may increase delay.	(a) Location, type, and caliber of artillery vicinity — (b) Location, type, and caliber of artillery in area(s) —
	c. Construction or occupation of several delaying positions in depth simultaneously, in rear of line of contact.	(1) Delaying forces may occupy positions in depth simultaneously, or may delay in successive positions.	(a) Entrenching and organization of the ground area(s) —, strength and composition of troops, vicinity (b) Dumping of ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment area(s) — —

5. REINFORCEMENT.	d. Increased activity by harassing troops on our flanks and rear.	(1) The enemy may seek to disrupt attacking and enveloping forces.	(a) Reports by units on our flanks and rear of strength, composition and location of harassing attacks.
	a. Movement of additional troops toward the forces opposing us.	(1) This action could increase enemy's present strength.	(a) Number, type, and rate of movement troops toward present enemy position from (b) Movement troops along road(s) — — toward present position.
	b. Increased traffic toward present position.	(1) This increased traffic may bring up additional troops and supplies.	(a) (Motor, rail, shipping, etc.) traffic from (N), (S), (E), or (W). (b) (Motor, rail, shipping, air transport, etc. traffic from (c) (Motor, rail, etc.) traffic along road(s) and RRs (d) Type, number, speed enemy vehicles moving toward present enemy position from particularly along road (e) Are decks of vessels crowded with troops and gear, or empty?
	c. Identification of new units in combat zone.	(1) The presence of new units in addition to units already present will increase enemy's strength.	(a) New identifications. (b) Identify — —

GUIDE TO PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE PLAN—Continued

EEI dealing with—	Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	Explanation	Basis for specific orders and requests (facts to be reported on by collecting agencies)
	d. Increased aggressiveness or patrolling on part of force in contact.	(1) This activity might indicate the presence of additional units.	(a) Number, size, identifications, and activities patrols in area — — (b) Location CPs, supply and evacuation installations particularly in area
	e. Additional CPs, supply and evacuation installations.	(1) Presence of additional units could cause an increase in number of these installations.	(a) Location CPs, supply and evacuation installations.
6. TERRAIN.	a. Rivers.	(1) Size, speed, depth, banks, bottoms, etc., all have their effect on any operation.	(a) Size, speed, depth, banks, bottoms, and approaches to R.
	b. Critical terrain features.	(1) Hills, ridges, valleys, plains, roads, routes of communications, etc., influence any operation and must be taken into consideration.	(a) Military description of terrain in Z of action particular attention to — —




Figure 4.

21. INSTRUCTIONS TO COLLECTING AGENCIES. a.

General. When approved, the completed intelligence plan forms the basis for orders to all collecting agencies. These orders are either published to the collecting agencies in a field order, in the intelligence annex to a field order, or in fragmentary orders. When combat units are required to execute tactical operations in order to obtain information, their tactical missions only and not details of the information required will be covered by paragraph 3 of the field order.

b. Intelligence annex. (1) The intelligence annex may be issued by a division or higher unit when it can be distributed in time to be of use. In it the instructions to each collecting agency, taken from the G-2 plan, are placed together in one paragraph. Even though an annex is to be issued, missions of immediate importance should be given in fragmentary orders to the units concerned and later repeated in the annex, if they have not become obsolete by the time it is published.

(2) A form for the intelligence annex is prescribed in FM 101-5.

(3) Samples of forms which are intended for use at service schools to insure uniformity in instruction in the formulating of orders to be issued to reconnaissance agencies are shown in FM 101-5. In the field, these forms serve as a reminder to staff officers regarding the various elements of information which reconnaissance agencies may be instructed to obtain. Additionally, these forms may serve as supplements to the intelligence annex. In using these forms it must be borne in mind that the missions as they appear in the form are rarely complete and must therefore be amplified to be specific. Only appropriate missions should be indicated.

INTELLIGENCE (G-2) PLAN

Period covered: From: 0700 To: Time of Atk

(1) Essential elements of information	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action.	(4) Agencies to be employed						(5) Hour and desti- nation at which information is to be reported.
			1st Inf	2d Inf	1st Plat 1st Cav Rcn Tr	1st Cav Rcn Tr	Div Arty	Corps (G-2 Air)	
1. Will the enemy defend the Bonneauville Ridge? If so, what will be his dispositions, particularly the location of the flanks of his organized position and the strength and location of his reserves?	a. Entrenching and erection of bands of wire.	(1) Report entrenching and erection of bands of wire in the area: Cedar Ridge (361-751)—Bonneauville (359-747) — RJ 599 (358-743) — Whitehall (361-745). Observe particularly Whitehall, region of St. Luke's Church (360-746), and ridges north and northeast of RJ 617 (360-747) at 0830 and 1230. Photograph at 0830 the area: New Oxford (366-754) —Guldens (359-753)—Two Taverns (355-744) —Littlestown (364-739).						X	(1) 0930 and 1300 to Div CP. Photos to Div CP by 1600.

		(2) Report location and extent of entrenching and erection of bands of wire north of Bonneauville—Square Corner Road. South of line CR 562 (357-751) and Cedar Ridge and west of road Bonneauville to CR 573 (360-752).	X						(2) By 1300 to Div CP.
		(3) Same as (2) south of Bonneauville — Square Corner Road. North of road RJ at (351.3-744.8) —and CR 621 (359-744) and west of generally north south road from CR 621 to Bonneauville.		X					(3) Same as (2).
		(4) Same as (2) north of line CR 562 (357-751) —CR 573 (360-752).			X				(4) Same as (2).
		(5) Same as (2) south of road from CR at (351.3-744.8)—CR 621.				X			(5) Same as (2).

INTELLIGENCE (G-2) PLAN—Continued

Period covered: From: 0700 To: Time of Atk—Continued

(1) Essential elements of information	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action.	(4) Agencies to be employed						(5) Hour and desti- nation at which information is to be reported.
			1st Inf	2d Inf	1st Plat 1st Cav Rcn Tr	1st Cav Rcn Tr	Div Arty	Corps (G-2 Air)	
	b. Artillery dis- posed in depth (to include AT weapons).	(6) Observe area: Cedar Ridge — Bonneauville — CR 621 — Whitehall — Mt. Rock School at 0830 and 1230 and report loca- tion of gun positions observed. Observe par- ticularly valleys south of Valley School (362-747) and region south of CR 593 (362-750). Report all movements of artil- lery observed.						X	(6) Same as (1).
		(7) Report location of all batteries observed, giving quantity, caliber, and direction of fire.					X		(7) Same as (1).

		(8) Conduct reconnaissance to vicinity Square Corner to locate and report enemy artillery vicinity Square Corner—Valley School.			X				(8) Same as (2).
		(9) Conduct reconnaissance to St. Luke's Church and Square Corner to locate and report hostile field artillery units.			X				(9) Same as (2).

Note: This is a partial solution. It is incomplete in that only two indications of the essential element of information relating to defensive action on the part of the enemy are included. The complete solution would be a continuation in the same manner to cover all indications of defense and the remaining essential elements of information and all indications under each. This solution should not be copied to solve practical or school problems.

Figure 5.

SECTION IV

COLLATION OF INFORMATION

22. PURPOSE. The purpose of collation is the arrangement of information in a systematic manner to facilitate its use by G-2. The process involves the sorting and grouping of information by type so that items of the same kind may be kept together for convenience of comparison and study.

23. METHOD OF RECORDING. **a. General.** In matters relative to the recording of information, this manual will be considered only as a guide. *The intelligence officer of every unit must adapt procedure to the needs of his unit and arm or service. Simplification of method will be especially necessary in the small units of the more mobile arms.* Under no circumstances should a G-2 allow himself to be engulfed in a mass of paper work. When the situation is moving rapidly the maintenance of all records will be subordinated to the real mission of assembling and interpreting information and disseminating military intelligence. No complicated system of processing messages should be adopted; action must come first; records are of secondary importance.

b. Standard records. After the initial examination, each item of information should be recorded in such a manner as to be convenient for reference and study. Each item is recorded in one or more ways; in the

G-2 journal, the G-2 work sheet, upon the G-2 situation map, in target or objective folders, or in the documents pertaining to order of battle. Sometimes a single item will be recorded in all. By these means, a systematic running account is kept of all information received at headquarters and the intelligence officer is enabled conveniently to evaluate and interpret the information and later to classify and prepare it for use and dissemination as military intelligence. The journal, work sheet, and situation map are necessary in the preparation of G-2 reports and serve as a convenient means of reference for the commander and for members of his staff.

24. G-2 JOURNAL. a. General. The G-2 journal is the daybook of the intelligence section. It is kept by the intelligence section of each combat unit down to include the division. In units in which the intelligence section personnel are few in number, the intelligence journal may be combined with those of the other staff sections. It contains briefs of important written and oral messages received and sent, as well as notations of periodic reports, orders, records of important conferences, and similar matters that pertain directly to the intelligence section. If the item is received or issued in oral form it should be summarized in written form and handled as a regular message; if it is in documentary form the entry may consist of a reference and a brief synopsis of contents.

b. Permanent record. The journal is kept as a permanent record and should be looked upon as the main and primary record of the operations of the intelligence

section of the staff. For this reason, entries in the journal are made immediately upon receipt of the report of the event. The original entry should not be altered, but may be supplemented by subsequent entries.

c. Disposition. The journal is either closed daily or at the end of a phase or period. One copy of it is turned over to the chief of staff for consolidation with the other journals of the headquarters. The journal is supported by a file of original orders, reports, special reports, studies, and maps pertinent to the operations of the military intelligence section.

d. Form. The form of the journal is prescribed in FM 101-5.

25. G-2 WORK SHEET. a. Purpose. The purpose of the work sheet is to facilitate systematic arrangement of information coming into the intelligence section so that all items bearing on a particular subject will be grouped together for ready reference and comparison. In this respect, the work sheet differs from the G-2 journal in which the information is entered chronologically. A secondary purpose of the work sheet is to facilitate preparation of the G-2 periodic report. For this reason, the paragraphing of the G-2 work sheet is similar to the G-2 periodic report, suitable space being left under each heading for the entry of pertinent information.

b. Method. The work sheet is merely a convenient memorandum for the G-2 and is not a permanent document. It should always be up to date, obsolete items being either lined out or withdrawn.

26. G-2 SITUATION MAP. a. General. The G-2 situation map is kept by G-2 of each combat unit. Upon it is recorded graphically by military symbols (FM 21-30) all available information of the enemy in a convenient form for ready reference and study. The situation map supplements but cannot take the place of the work sheet.

b. Purpose. The map used for this purpose should be the best available. Its proper scale will depend on the size of the unit; the smaller the unit, the larger should be the scale of the map. However, higher headquarters should have on hand copies of all maps used by subordinate units down to the smallest, so that there will be no danger of having reports or messages refer to places not shown on the maps available at headquarters.

c. Coverage. The terrain covered should include that in possession of our own troops as well as that held by the enemy. Information of the enemy that is of importance to the particular unit is placed on the situation map by means of conventional signs or symbols, care being taken to prevent it from becoming too cluttered up. This information will vary with the size of the unit; the smaller the unit, the more detailed the information recorded.

d. Method of keeping. The location of the command posts of higher, lower, and adjacent units, the boundaries between the major subordinate units, the location of friendly reconnaissance units and, when there is an appreciable distance between our lines and those of the enemy, the trace of our front line constitutes the minimum friendly information which should be shown on the G-2 situation map. In order to esti-

mate the enemy capabilities which, if adopted, would affect the command, it is desirable to keep dispositions of major subordinate friendly units on the G-2 situation map. Corps and division G-2 situation maps should show the location of friendly as well as hostile battalions. This information is secured from G-3. All information concerning the enemy is furnished to G-3. By mutual agreement between G-2 and G-3, draftsmen of one section may enter appropriate information on the situation map of the other section. When this is done the G-2 and G-3 maps contain the same information. In order that the G-2 may estimate the enemy capabilities which may affect future plans, G-2 should receive copies of operation overlays and plans prepared by G-3.

e. Continuity. The situation map is kept constantly up to date, new sheets being used when necessary. A tracing or a copy of this map, showing the situation as known at the close of the period, should accompany the intelligence report.

f. Section maps. In regiments and lower units it may not be necessary for each staff section to keep a separate situation map. Under such conditions the data from each staff section will ordinarily be entered on one map which is kept under supervision of the executive officer. In divisions, when required by the situation, a joint G-2-G-3 situation map may be kept. It is advisable, normally, for G-2 and G-3 sections in all units to maintain separate situation maps in order to eliminate interference with other sections.

27. OBSERVER'S REPORT. The observer's report is an intelligence document in which is reported enemy in-

formation for a given period or mission. Forms for observers' reports are given in FM 30-10 and in Field Manuals for the arms.

28. TARGET FOLDERS AND OBJECTIVE FOLDERS.

Air force intelligence records are described in FM 1-40.

29. G-2 FILES. a. Message. Copies of the messages sent and received are preserved carefully as they support entries in the journal, work sheet, situation map, documents pertaining to order of battle, and the G-2 periodic report.

b. Information. A suitably indexed file is kept of all information that may be of future value. This should be accompanied by supplementary situation maps or overlays taken from the situation map. For example, during a period of stabilization, much information will be collected which is of no immediate interest but which may become invaluable in case an attack is ordered. This will cover such subjects as the hostile defenses, condition of roads, railways and bridges within the hostile lines, location and contents of supply establishments, location of hostile reserves, and many other items. If published in periodic reports as it comes in, it will be disregarded and forgotten by most of the recipients and will not be available when needed. A preferable method is to place this information in a file, where it will be available for immediate check against new information. When an operation is planned in which the information will be needed, G-2 should issue a situation map and a study or special report embodying all available pertinent information.

Such data may include shelled areas, gassed areas, sensitive points, movements, supply establishments, artillery locations, and progress of enemy works.

c. Air photographs. Information pertaining to the filing of air photographs is covered in FM 30-21.

d. Personal files prohibited. Personal collections of documents are strictly forbidden. Every item of information regardless of its source or content is official and must be recorded promptly and filed in the prescribed manner.

e. Documents. Processing of captured documents is covered in FM 30-15.

f. Order of battle. The degree of detail of the order of battle records kept at each headquarters varies according to the size of the unit. However, regardless of the echelon, the order of battle should include all enemy units to the front of the unit, on its flanks, and in reserve. The following are the principal mechanical aids to maintaining the order of battle at any echelon:

(1) *Order of battle map.* This is a work map for plotting the locations and movement of enemy units as well as the probable location of boundaries.

(2) *Order of battle worksheet.* This is a systematic form for the recording of enemy identifications and detail of units identified for the purpose of determining the order of battle. On it is listed all known components of an enemy unit once the unit or one of its components has been identified. The sources of identification, the time, location, branch, weapons, transport, personalities of commanders and other details, such as code names and numbers, are listed thereon. As additional identifications are reported, the details are entered in turn on their respective line with a view

ORDER OF BATTLE WORKSHEET

(Front side)

Unit _____ CO _____ Subordinated to: _____

Code name & No. _____ : _____

Divisional district _____ : _____

Components (Arm or service)	Code name and number	Commander	Depot and/or home designation	Location	T/O strength	Est Str (OS or LS) ¹	Source Time and date ²	Reporting unit Time and date ³

¹ OS: Operational strength.

LS: Local strength.

² Identify Source PW rpt #101, Trans #203, Captured map, dated 2 May, etc.

³ Unit from which identification was received. "1st Bn, 2d Inf 1513001," etc.

(Reverse side)

Organization	Weapons	Transport	Remarks

Figure 6.

to determining what portion of the unit is engaged or may be engaged in combat and in determining total strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment. (See fig. 6.)

(3) *Unit cards.* There is one such card for each unit of the size with which the headquarters in question is concerned (division, regiment, battalion, or even company). On this card are entered, with date and source, all data regarding the location, strength, composition, personnel, and equipment of the unit. A brief evaluation of the information recorded will often assist in the final evaluation and interpretation of the information. Unit cards are impractical below division level where the order of battle worksheet may be substituted therefor. (See fig. 7.)

UNIT HISTORY CARD

Unit: Nth Infantry Regt.

Code:

C. O.: Col. A——

<i>Date</i>	<i>Information</i>	<i>Source</i>
26 May	Nth Inf. at X	Report #001
5 June	Enemy map dated 12 May places unit at X	Report #002
7 June	Col. A—— seen in X area	Report #007
10 June	Ten (10) heavily laden trucks seen moving south to X along Highway #4.	Report #019

Figure 7.

(4) *Personality cards.* One card is kept for each commander or other military personality of significance and includes all the information received regarding him. These cards, used in conjunction with the unit cards, are of great value in checking unit identifications, dispositions, movements, and possible changes in the command organizations. These cards are generally impractical below army or corps level. (See fig. 8.)

PERSONALITY FILE CARD

Name :

Rank and Branch: Lt. Col., Inf.

Assignment: Commanding Officer.

Unit: 1st Inf. Regt., 1st Inf. Div.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Information</i>	<i>Source</i>
9 Dec.	Civilians report Col. A. B. at X	Report #017
1 Jan.	Captured diary states Lt. Col. A in Command of 1st Inf. Regt. since 19 April.	Report #023
24 Feb.	Personal papers of Col. A found in farmhouse (84.33-17.22).	Report #137

Figure 8.

(5) *Order of battle report.* Order of battle reports may be made by the order of battle personnel of a unit to the unit G-2 daily and weekly or as required. In-

formation of immediate importance is reported as received. (See fig. 9.)

HEADQUARTERS, —TH INFANTRY DIVISION

Order of Battle Branch, G-2 Section

24 May 19—.

Daily Order of Battle Report #124:

1. Units identified during period:
(Unit, code, source, location, and date of source, remarks).
2. Unidentified code names and numbers:
(Code, source, location, and date of source, remarks).
3. Personalities:
(Name, rank, unit, assignment, location, and date of source, remarks).
4. Estimate of enemy strength and dispositions:
5. Miscellaneous:

Figure 9.

SECTION V

EVALUATION AND INTERPRETATION OF INFORMATION

30. PURPOSE. The purpose of critical and systematic analysis of enemy information is to determine its probable accuracy, significance and importance. Information subjected to this process becomes military intelligence. G-2 should not merely transmit information but should analyze, evaluate, and interpret enemy information and transmit the resulting military intelligence to all concerned. Military intelligence must be concise, free from irrelevant matter, and ready for immediate use; at the same time it must be so complete as to convey not only facts but also their significance, as well as all deductions to be drawn from a consideration of them in connection with other intelligence already at hand.

31. EVALUATION. Upon receipt by the G-2 section, all information should be subjected to the following analysis to determine its probable intelligence value:

a. Initial examination. Immediately upon its receipt in the G-2 section, each item of information should be subjected to a preliminary examination to determine whether or not it has intelligence value. This involves a consideration of the following points:

(1) Is it information of the enemy or of terrain not under our control?

(2) Is it information needed immediately, and if so, by whom?

(3) Is it information of future value?

(4) Is it information of value to this unit or to higher, subordinate, or neighboring units?

b. Credibility of source. Credibility of the source or agency reporting information must be determined. The following are some of the important points to receive attention:

(1) Judging from previous experience, is the source of information accurate and reliable?

(2) Under conditions existing at the time, that is, distance, means employed, visibility, etc., could the information have been obtained?

c. Accuracy. Accuracy of the information must be determined. This is facilitated by a consideration of the following points:

(1) Is it confirmed or corroborated by other information previously received?

(2) In what respects does it agree or disagree with available information covering the same point, particularly that known to be correct?

(3) If it is at variance with information previously received and the different items cannot be reconciled, which is more likely to be correct?

32. INTERPRETATION. a. Probable significance. The accuracy and credibility of information having been determined by comparing it with information previously received, the intelligence officer's next step is to interpret it in the light of its probable significance. The following are some of the important questions that should be considered:

(1) What does it mean in connection with what is already known?

(2) Does it alter or add significance to information previously received?

(3) Does it tend to confirm the estimate as to the enemy situation or does it indicate that the estimate is incorrect?

b. Purpose. Up to this point in the intelligence officer's reasoning, his deductions have been concerned only with the facts of the enemy situation. The whole process has been an effort to establish accurately the facts. Based on the situation, conclusions as to the enemy capabilities should be reached later.

33. ANSWER TO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. Relative to terrain. Essential elements of information relating to the terrain may be answered as soon as sufficient credible information is available upon which to base a conclusion.

b. Relative to enemy. Essential elements of enemy information may be answered only after careful check of evaluated and interpreted information against all possible lines of action open to the enemy. The intelligence officer endeavors to verify or disprove the hypothesis relative to each enemy capability. To do this, he obtains all the facts possible concerning the enemy situation—facts bearing on each hypothesis. Then, in the light of these ascertained facts, he considers whether the enemy is still capable of acting in accordance with a certain hypothesis. By eliminating as many of these hypotheses as possible, he narrows down the lines of action which were originally open to the enemy to those which are still open to him. The

changes in the enemy situation may result in new capabilities resulting in changes in essential elements of information, the G-2 plan and orders issued to intelligence agencies. Unless the enemy has so committed himself as to be physically capable of only one line of action affecting our mission, any attempted deduction as to his probable intentions is a guess which, if not rejected by the commander, is likely to prove misleading and, to result in faulty decisions. Commanders should not expect or require their intelligence officers to attempt such deductions. Even captured enemy orders may prove misleading, as the hostile commander may revoke them and adopt a new line of action, or they may have been prepared with the intention of having them captured as a means of deception. It may be useful for G-2 to express a conclusion that present enemy dispositions favor a certain hostile line of action, but as long as more than one line remains open, the commander must base his own estimate of the situation on all possible lines of action. If a commander cannot guard against all enemy capabilities, a properly framed G-2 estimate will enable him to take a calculated risk.

34. CONCLUSIONS. a. How determined. The study of all available information should enable G-2 to—

- (1) Determine the enemy capabilities or the lines of action open to the enemy that would have a bearing on the accomplishment of the commander's mission.

- (2) Determine the conditions under which any particular capability may be carried out; for example, the time, place and strength of an attack.

- (3) Draw conclusions in certain cases as to the rela-

tive probability of adoption of lines of action open to the enemy.

b. Elimination of enemy capabilities. The factual information collected, collated, evaluated and interpreted by G-2 should permit the commander to plan his operation, taking into account the lines of action open to the enemy. Additional information acquired during the progress of operations should enable G-2 progressively to narrow down the lines of action open to the enemy in time to prevent surprise.

SECTION VI

G-2 ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION

35. G-2 ESTIMATE. a. General. A G-2 estimate of the enemy situation will be furnished the commander by G-2, either upon his own initiative when warranted by the developments in the situation or when required by the commander. The estimate may be in writing but is ordinarily presented orally. It will summarize the enemy situation and possible plans. Usually G-2 will be able to anticipate the necessity for an estimate. He should study the situation continuously, and be prepared to present an estimate at any time.

b. Form. A form for a G-2 estimate of the enemy situation is as follows:

G-2 ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION

Title
Place
Date and hour

1. Summary of the enemy situation.¹
 - a. Enemy activities in forward areas² and new identifications.
 - b. Movements, concentrations, and establishments in rear areas.³
 - c. Terrain and weather as they affect the enemy.

¹ Omit subheadings when these are not applicable.

² Forward areas may be interpreted as that area between the forward elements and the positions of artillery supporting front line action, inclusive.

³ Rear areas may be interpreted as that area extending from the artillery positions, included in note 2 above, exclusive, to and including the supply installations of the enemy unit one echelon higher, that is, division—corps, corps—army.

2. Conclusions.

- a. *Enemy capabilities.* An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command.⁴
- b. (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the foregoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.
(2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.⁵

(Signature of chief of section)

c. A-2 estimate. A form for an A-2 estimate of the enemy situation is set forth in FM 1-40.

⁴ Each capability should be listed separately in one sentence, covering what, where, strength, when and, where applicable, from where.

⁵ This justification usually must consist of definite information of enemy dispositions which favor one or more capabilities and militate against others. Under exceptional circumstances, even though the enemy dispositions may not favor any particular capability, a thorough knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine, recent performances, national psychology, and the character and mentality of the hostile commander may justify an indication of priority. The basis for indicating a priority must be clearly stated. When the enemy dispositions do not favor any capability, the mere fact that G-2 thinks he would adopt a certain line of action if he were in the place of the enemy, or that the terrain favors a certain capability, is insufficient justification.

SECTION VII

DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

36. NECESSITY. Military intelligence is of no value unless it reaches the individuals or units concerned in time to serve their purposes. It is therefore of the utmost importance that it be properly disseminated in accordance with its urgency. Each item of information must be examined carefully by a qualified officer to ascertain what dissemination should be made of it. If it is a written message, the dissemination made should be indicated on the face of the message, or on a form attached to the message. In any case, the dissemination made should be entered in the journal.

37. METHODS. **a. Personal contact.** It is frequently possible for G-2 or his assistants to transmit, either in person or by telephone, items of information of immediate value to those concerned. Exchange of information may be encouraged by requiring intelligence officers of subordinate units to make frequent routine reports by telephone or teletypewriter.

b. Special messages. When it is impossible for G-2 to transmit important information in person or by telephone, special messages may be transmitted by airplane, motorcycle messenger, or other rapid means of communication.

c. Conferences. The exchange of information between the various military intelligence sections of

higher, lower, and adjacent units is facilitated by frequent personal conferences between the staff officers concerned.

d. G-2 periodic report. (1) The G-2 periodic report is an intelligence document that sums up information which has been collected, evaluated, and interpreted during a given period. It is issued by all military intelligence sections of combat units from the army to the division, inclusive, and is usually supplemented by a situation map or overlay. Brigades, regiments, and lower units may submit one staff or unit report which includes appropriate paragraphs relative to intelligence. The period of time to be covered by this report is prescribed by higher headquarters or by the unit commander in the absence of such instructions. It is a convenient means for keeping higher, lower, and adjacent units informed of the enemy situation as determined by the unit preparing the report. In this connection, it is important that copies of periodic reports or of summaries of the enemy situation be disseminated to lower units to keep them informed of the over-all enemy situation. It frequently contains important information which has already been disseminated by means of special messages.

(2) Each commander is most interested in hostile units of the same size as his own. The subordinate units should be able to obtain from the periodic G-2 report and the situation map the facts concerning the enemy situation so far as they have been determined at the time of the report. In the smaller units, such as the battalion and regiment, the report will go into considerable detail and consider the very smallest hostile element. Going up the scale of command, the

reports become less detailed and treat the information from a broader viewpoint.

(3) The G-2 periodic report will usually be of considerable interest to higher authority, although the information contained therein frequently will be known prior to its arrival. Periodic reports will contain details which may be essential to certain studies, and also information which, even though not demanding immediate exploitation, is nevertheless of considerable importance to higher authority; for example, data on hostile tactical methods.

(4) G-2 reports and situation maps are intended primarily for use during contact with the enemy. They also serve a purpose for units not engaged, for they permit all commanders to keep in touch with the general situation of the enemy and with the local situation at points where the unit is likely to be engaged.

(5) The form for the G-2 periodic report is prescribed in FM 101-5. Time of submitting reports is important. The submission of reports from subordinate units should be so timed as to include late hostile information and dispositions early enough to permit consolidation and forwarding by higher headquarters so that information can reach all echelons while still current and usable.

e. Special reports. Although higher echelons will receive copies of the periodic G-2 reports of the next lower unit, these periodic reports, as has been indicated, are more or less complete documents with rather wide distribution. Their preparation, reproduction, and transmission will require much more time than would a brief message capable of being transmitted by telephone. Consequently, higher echelons, in addition

to receiving periodic reports, will usually require special reports from lower units summarizing the situation and enemy capabilities. These reports lack the mass of detail normally contained in a periodic report, but present the general picture to higher authority and in particular contain such information as would be of interest to the latter. They should be prepared in written form by G-2 and approved by the commander or chief of staff. They may take the form suggested in paragraph 35 for the G-2 estimate of the situation.

f. Divisional histories. Based upon the study of the enemy order of battle, the intelligence section of theater, army group, army and corps may prepare and issue to divisions and higher units concise histories of enemy divisions. If issued, these documents will ordinarily include information on composition, strength, morale, tactics, armament, previous service, and an estimate of the combat worth of each enemy division. Information on qualifications and character of the principal enemy commanders should also be included.

g. Other methods. Intelligence is also disseminated by War Department intelligence publications, technical intelligence summaries and the following methods which are described in FM 101-5: G-2 estimate of the enemy situation, paragraph 1a of the field order, intelligence annex, and tactical study of the terrain.

SECTION VIII

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

38. BASIC PRINCIPLES. Military intelligence training in all echelons of command will include instruction in the collection, recording, evaluation, and interpretation of information of the enemy and the terrain, the dissemination of military intelligence, various means of concealing information of our own capabilities or plans, and measures to be taken to prevent the enemy from influencing our action by means of propaganda.

39. RESPONSIBILITY. a. The commander. The commanding officer is responsible for intelligence training within his command, and that all officers and enlisted men have an understanding of their military intelligence duties. In battalions and higher organizations, he is assisted in carrying out this responsibility by an assistant chief of staff, G-2.

b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. The assistant chief of staff, G-2, is directly responsible for the training of his intelligence section and for the supervision of the training of intelligence sections of all subordinate echelons of command. He collaborates with the assistant chief of staff, G-3, in preparation of training programs. He supervises the intelligence training of all personnel in accordance with his commander's policies.

40. APPLICATION. a. Training. Training in military intelligence will not be restricted to personnel as-

signed to the military intelligence sections of various headquarters. Appropriate instruction in this subject will be given to all officers and enlisted men because all military personnel have a part to play in military intelligence. Personnel assigned to intelligence duties will be given additional and more thorough instruction appropriate to their assignment. This section deals more in detail with the training of this personnel in the infantry. With appropriate modifications and additions, it is applicable to all arms and services.

b. Responsibility. Some of the arms and services are charged with activities of immediate importance in military intelligence. These arms and services are responsible for preparation of detailed training programs and instruction of specialists for performance of these duties.

41. QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL. Only officers and enlisted men who have a good general military background should be considered for specialized intelligence training. If it is impossible to secure this type of personnel, officers and men will be selected for intelligence duty only after they have completed a course in basic military instruction.

a. Officers. A unit intelligence officer should have the following qualifications:

(1) A thorough knowledge of the organization and operation of his own type of unit and a complete understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the reconnaissance elements thereof.

(2) A thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of intelligence agencies available to higher, lower, and adjacent units.

(3) The ability to cooperate closely with G-3 in preparing orders for the collection of information, and insuring that all plans and orders are based on the latest intelligence.

(4) A thorough knowledge of tactical doctrines, organization, and equipment of our own and enemy forces.

(5) The possession of a practical knowledge and appreciation of maps and map reading, and the procurement and use of air photographs.

(6) The energy and tact required to work closely and consistently with the G-2's of higher, lower, and adjacent units.

(7) The capacity to appreciate the relative importance of the various items of information available.

(8) The ability to organize his section and attached intelligence teams, and to operate them efficiently.

b. Enlisted men. Enlisted men selected for intelligence duty should be of excellent physique, good judgment, observant mind, and possess initiative, imagination, zeal, energy, and a keen sense of responsibility. They should have the equivalent of a high school education, and should be capable of expressing themselves clearly and of writing a legible hand. In addition to these personal qualifications, they should be trained soldiers before their special intelligence training is begun.

42. METHOD. Specialized intelligence training is best accomplished by centralized instruction. The regiment should include an intelligence school in its program of instruction. This school should be conducted by the regimental intelligence officer with the assistance and

under the supervision of the division G-2. The regularly assigned intelligence personnel and selected men detailed from battalions and companies will undergo the course of instruction. The course should contain both theoretical and practical instruction. Tests for proficiency should include a practical demonstration of ability to perform the various duties of the intelligence section.

43. REGIMENTAL COURSE OF INSTRUCTION. a. Program. The detailed training program in the regimental intelligence school will include the following subjects:

- (1) Military organization.
- (2) Object, organization, and description of the intelligence organization from battalion to division, inclusive.
- (3) Collection, recording, evaluation, and interpretation of information.
- (4) Dissemination of military intelligence.
- (5) Theory and practice of observation, including recognition and appreciation of what is of military value; rendering of accurate, clear, concise, and relevant reports; and establishment and operation of observation posts.
- (6) Installation and operation of field telephones.
- (7) Use of the compass, field glasses, and simple stereoscope.
- (8) Conventional signs, military symbols, and abbreviations.
- (9) Map and air photograph reading.
- (10) Sketching.
- (11) Examination and filing of air photographs.

(12) Allowance, requisition, distribution, use, and care of maps.

(13) Keeping the situation map and the preparation of overlays.

(14) Verbal and written reports and messages.

(15) Examination of enemy personnel, repatriates, captured documents, and matériel.

(16) Identification of the enemy's uniform, distinctive markings, and habits.

(17) Counterintelligence measures, including secrecy discipline, preparation and use of documents, signal communication security, movements of troops and individuals, and censorship and counterpropaganda.

(18) Identification of friendly and enemy aircraft, armored vehicles, and shipping.

(19) Scouting and patrolling dismounted.

(20) Motorized reconnaissance.

(21) Visual signaling.

(22) Cross-country movements by day and by night.

(23) Camouflage, camouflage discipline, and the art of concealment.

(24) Means of communication.

(25) Appearance and forms of activity of different arms of the service.

(26) Elementary tactical instruction.

b. Training. Training should not end with the completion of the regimental intelligence school, but should be continued and perfected by repetition. In active operations, rest periods should be utilized to correct deficiencies and complete the training of replacements.

44. DIVISIONAL COURSE OF INSTRUCTION. When the division is assembled as a unit or its various elements are in close proximity to each other, a divisional school should be established under direct supervision of the assistant chief of staff, G-2. This course should precede the regimental course and should include instruction for all officers and selected noncommissioned officers of the division assigned to intelligence duties on the following subjects:

a. Organization and duties of the intelligence sections, from battalion to GHQ, inclusive.

b. Maintenance and use of the regimental and divisional intelligence records.

c. Ground reconnaissance and observation.

d. Artillery intelligence sections.

e. Signal intelligence.

f. Examination of enemy personnel, repatriates, documents, and matériel at the various echelons of command.

g. Enemy order of battle.

h. Topographic engineers, including requisition and issue of maps within the division.

i. Air reconnaissance, including visual observation and air photography (flights to be made by the officers).

j. Coordination of air photography and tactical interpretation of air photographs.

k. Terrain studies intended to familiarize the student with effect of terrain upon operations, military resources of the theater of operations, engineer information to be gained from a knowledge or view of the country, and use of foreign maps.

l. Meteorological information and influence of weather conditions upon operations.

m. Use of ground and cover.

- n. Counterintelligence measures within the division.
- o. Camouflage, camouflage discipline, and the art of concealment and deception.
- p. Identification of friendly and enemy aircraft, armored vehicles, and shipping.
- q. Publicity and propaganda.
- r. Tactics and characteristics of weapons of the various arms.
- s. Lectures on appropriate foreign armies and countries, with the object of developing points of strength and weakness of each.

45. MANEUVERS. Practical training in military intelligence prior to actual operations is extremely difficult. If any degree of proficiency is to be maintained, it is imperative that careful consideration is given to the subject in the preparation and execution of maneuvers, particularly two-sided maneuvers. Intelligence measures that may be actively employed include visual and photographic air reconnaissance; ground reconnaissance by combat elements; ground observation; signal intelligence, including surveillance of our own communication, and the interception of communication of the opposing side; supervision in all units of security arrangements for the safeguarding of military information; use of camouflage and camouflage discipline; restrictions on use of lights; identification of aircraft; preparation and distribution of air photographs as supplements to maps; policies regarding maps to be used and map allowances; requisition and distribution of maps; and reception and supervision of visitors. The latter measure should, under no circumstances, be allowed to divert the attention of the assistant chief of staff, G-2, from other and more important duties.

46. INTELLIGENCE SCHOOLS OF HIGHER HEADQUARTERS. Success of the intelligence service as a whole will depend in large measure upon selection of suitable personnel and their proper training. Commanders of all echelons and the War Department may establish intelligence schools for instruction of selected personnel. Officers detailed to these schools who fail to measure up to the highest standards should be promptly relieved. The schools should include practical instruction in various military intelligence activities and detailed instruction on the enemy country and army.

APPENDIX

SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF INTELLIGENCE SECTIONS

1. Suggested methods covering the organization for combat of an army, corps, and division G-2 section are set forth in functional charts A, B, and C below.

2. In the application of these charts, the following provisions apply:

a. Assigned personnel may vary from time to time. Regardless of whether a different number of personnel is assigned or attached, the principles of organization as shown on these charts apply.

b. The duty teams of the Combat Intelligence Division work in shifts of 6 or 8 hours. The team on duty handles all routine. It rests the first shift off duty. During its second shift off duty it performs its share of the items listed below, some of which, such as keeping the Work Sheet, may be performed by personnel in the teams while on duty:

- (1) Intelligence Plan.
- (2) Intelligence Summary.
- (3) Periodic Report—Work Sheet.
- (4) Estimates.
- (5) Terrain Intelligence and Studies.
- (6) Visits to Troops.
- (7) Situation Report.
- (8) Captured Matériel.
- (9) Counterintelligence.


c. During periods when the command post is being moved, one team may be on duty at the new location and one at the old at the same time.

d. No complicated system of processing messages should be adopted. Action must take precedence over processing. First, incoming messages should go to the *officer* on duty who should transmit the information rapidly by hand—telephone—teletype—radio, etc., to the agency which can do something about it. Written confirmation will be sent later when necessary. The message will be marked clearly as confirmed. Secondly, the messages may then be processed as follows: The draftsman numbers the message and places the information on the situation map. The journal clerk enters it in the journal. The stenographer makes copies for interested commanders and staff sections, and enters it in the message file. G-2 and G-3 must exchange all pertinent messages. Arrangements must be made for G-2 to keep appropriate enemy information on the G-3 situation map and for G-3 to keep appropriate friendly information on the G-2 situation map.


e. The organization shown on these charts is suggested for 24-hour operation during combat. At critical times during combat all members of the section may be on duty. During training, planning, or static situations, all members of the section may be on duty during the day with a duty officer or specific personnel of the section on duty at night.

f. Regardless of whether order of battle, photo interpreter, or other intelligence specialists are organic or attached in teams, and regardless of changes in numbers or grades and ratings, the principles of organization and functionings as set forth in these charts apply.

CHART A • GUIDE FOR ORGANIZATION



FOR COMBAT OF G-2 SECTION



* Organized as prescribed under current air-ground training literature. (Note: See Note 1 below).


** As provided.

*** Assigned or attached as prescribed in current Tables of Organization & Equipment.

Notes:

1. Organization and operation of the G-2 Air Section and the Army Photo Intelligence Center will be in accordance with current air-ground training literature.
2. During lapses in combat, the Training and Testing Division is augmented by personnel from the Combat Intelligence Division. The situation may warrant placing the Training and Testing Division under the Chief of the Combat Intelligence Division.
3. Weather intelligence will be provided by the Tactical Air Command. (Mobile liaison units should be provided from the Weather Squadron of the Tactical Air Command for duty at the Army Command Post).

CHART B • GUIDE FOR ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT OF G-2 SECTION




• Organized as prescribed under current air-ground training literature.

** Assigned or attached as prescribed in current Tables of Organization & Equipment.

- Notes:**
1. Weather Intelligence may be provided by the Tactical Air Command, either through the Army G-2 Section or by attaching a mobile liaison unit from the Weather Squadron for duty at the Corps Command Post.
 2. It is desirable for a Signal Officer from any cooperating Signal Intelligence unit to work directly with the G-2 section.


CHART C (I) • GUIDE FOR ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT OF G-2 SECTION



* Assigned or attached as prescribed in current Tables of Organization & Equipment.

- Notes:
1. 1 Officer of the Photo Interpretation Branch will assist the G-2 on all G-2-Air matters.
 2. The Division may operate in 2 teams instead of three—as shown on Chart C (II) below.

CHART C (II)



Notes:

1. The same provisions covering the assignment or attachment of personnel as noted under Chart C (I) apply.

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